To say that we as individuals and society as a whole would benefit from all of us being moral, would be to assume that morality is real. If morality is real, it would make sense that there is some property in the universe that is the basic components of moral ideas like goodness. In this essay I provide an argument for moral realism, that moral properties exist as a supervenient relationship on neural correlates. I also show that moral judgment is developed through experience via an enabling, triggering and sensitizing role. My moral education argument is: moral properties are seen from their neural correlates and through some form of experiential training we can achieve the ability to provide training for people to accelerate their moral judgment and detect those who lack the necessary neural substrates and provide support to prevent immoral or antisocial mistakes. First, let us determine if there is any substance to these ideas of morality.
Ethical Naturalism and Non-Naturalism
In his paper Ethical Naturalism, Non-Naturalism and In Between, Ralph Wedgewood makes an effort to determine the nature of moral properties. He begins by framing the inquiry in the context of metaphysics and metaethics by asking ‘What are moral properties?’ and ‘How do they fit within reality as a whole?’. Wedgewoods essay falls within the area of Metaphysics, defined as the philosophical study and understanding of the nature of reality.
First, Wedgewood discusses a middle ground between reductive naturalism and primitivist non-naturalism, then reviews assumptions in his view of moral realism. For a statement to be an ethical one, it must express a moral concept within it. For example, ‘helping her out would be good’; where goodness is the concept expressed in the statement. The second assumption Wedgewood makes is that moral concepts have truth-conditional semantics. This means that the concept expressed with the predicate ‘would be good’ has the concept ‘goodness’ embedded in the predicate, which directly relates to the truth of the statement. Wedgewood states, “this property or relation is fixed by the nature of the concept as the property or relation that the concept stands for.” (2) Whether the statement is true, depends on the nature of the concept that is expressed within that statement. Wedgwood is assuming that what we express about goodness is a property itself that makes the statement about goodness true. The last assumption is that moral properties and relations are also to be found in the real world; the statement ‘x would be good’ can be found as an example in our world.
Wedgwood's goal is to include all properties that are of the same fundamentally metaphysical kind, as well as all evaluative and normative properties and relations. For example, the relation ‘being a good reason for,’ seen when an agent has an attitude towards something based on factual data, can be evoked in both an epistemic or moral context. This relation, ‘being a good reason for,’ is of the same fundamental kind whether it is used in an evaluative or normative context and hence the relation itself would be a moral property.
Faced with the metaphysical problem of how moral properties fit within the realm of all the other properties that exist, Wedgewood begins to discuss the notion of a natural property. A natural property is usually known by examples like cats, dogs, the sun, and whatever we learn from the physical cosmos. A supernatural concept would be something like god, ghosts and spirits. Lastly, a non-natural thing would be something like an abstract mathematical entity like numbers and the concept of division. Wedgewood identifies that these examples given are of particular objects, not properties, and what he is looking for, is a distinction between properties.
Due to this problem between natural objects and properties, Wedgewood directs our attention towards the relations between ethics and science. As we discussed before, properties and relations are both in the general category of properties. Wedgewood believes that there will be a more fruitful inquiry if we look into the relations of ethics that are comparable to other areas of science instead of solely looking for properties.
To begin this new avenue of inquiry, Wedgewood begins by making a modification to the definition of property. A property is defined as a) that which is paradigmatically found in the natural sciences and b) “a property that is, in its metaphysical character, of the same fundamental kind as these paradigmatic natural properties.” (Wedgewood 5) To bring more clarity to the second part of the definition, ‘metaphysical character and of the same fundamental kind’ can be understood as objective similarity in those relational properties. Wedgewood then updates the second part of the definition to, “(b) any other properties that are, in the most important respects, at least as similar to these paradigmatic natural properties as these paradigmatic properties are to each other.” (6) Switching from the category of ‘same fundamental kind’ to ‘at least as similar as they are to each other,’ allows us to include ethical relations of natural properties and solves the metaphysical problem of how ethics fits within our cosmology.
There are two fundamental metaphysical relations that Wedgewood identifies. The first is the relation of identity where moral properties are natural properties. The relation of identity is called full-blooded naturalism. The issue here is that moral properties are quite dissimilar to natural properties so an identity relation would violate the second modified definition of similarity.
The second metaphysical relation Wedgewood identifies is ‘being reducible to,’ or “reductive ethical naturalism, [where] all moral properties are reducible to natural properties.” (7) A real definition of the property is determined by giving an account of the property through an essential or constitutive feature of that property. The real definition's ability to point out essential or constitutive features means that the definition will point out cases in the world that apply to the predicate being used. A reductive definition is an exploratory principle offering a true explanation for every reduced property. The reductive definition needs to be non-trivial and non circular by the predicate being of a larger category, hence more metaphysically fundamental, than the specific case. This ends Wedgwood’s discussion of the two different forms of ethical naturalism: full blooded identity relation and the reductive account.
There are problems with the reductive account, which is encapsulated by primitive non-naturalism, that asks how these values fit into our empirical world view. Primitive non-naturalism essentially holds that moral properties are not natural properties because of three primary reasons; 1) moral properties are too different from the paradigmatic natural properties to be considered natural, 2) moral properties are causally inefficacious for there are no moral laws of nature we can measure, and 3) for the fundamental moral properties, there is no non-trivial real definition due to their primitive and unanalyzable nature.
G. E. Moore discussed his issue with moral properties being undefinable in his Principia Ethica. Moore uses the example of the term good is something that cannot be defined because it is simple and has no parts. There is no way for us to break down the components of what good is to give an accurate definition. Moore states that fundamental moral terms are “simple, something which you think of or perceive, and to any one who cannot think of or perceive them, you can never, by any definition, make their nature known.” (7) The composition and arrangement of properties of good cannot be known because it is a simple, primitive term that is unanalyzable. Wedgwood would respond to Moore in the same way as other primitive non-naturalists: there is an intermediate position where moral properties can be defined via a supervening relationship to mental and social properties.
A criticism by Dworkin is that if it were true that moral properties were natural, we would be able to find moral particles. (1996, 104) These moral particles do not fit with our contemporary view of physics and have never been observed hence sustaining skepticism of their existence. Wedgwood reminds us that “a real definition of moral properties should illuminate concerns the degree to which moral properties “carve” the world “at its joints”, as Plato put it (Phaedrus 265e).” (13) If we have a map of all the properties in the universe, the answers to our metaphysical questions would tell us if moral properties are even on the map, not to mention where in relation to other empirical properties. The simple answer, according to Wedgwood, is yes, and they reside near the map-space of the mind.
Wedgwood proposes an intermediate position between reductive naturalism and primitive non-naturalism. This solution is based on an essential link that connects moral and non-moral properties via psychology and social science. Here, Wedgwood explains an example, “‘To be good is to be G’. If this is an illuminating non-trivial definition, then it seems plausible that some non-moral property – say, the property of being F – will be mentioned somehow with this complex predicate ‘G’.” (20) Essentially, the moral property of goodness is found within a non-moral property, F, which would be a relation of a mental state or social situation. This is a solution to the primitive and non analyzable nature that Moore and primitive non-naturalists claim.
Basically, the solution to both naturalistic reduction and primitive non naturalistic issues identified earlier is a form of moral properties supervening on non-moral mental/social properties. The relationship of supervening moral properties “emerging from the world’s natural features without being reducible to them,” (Wedgwood 29) gives an intermediate position between reductive naturalism and primitive non naturalism. We can approach a natural understanding of moral properties as relationships with mental states, satisfying part of our reductive criteria, and yet define the properties based on the emergent properties found within the predicate, ‘To be good is to be G’, where G is some social or psychological property.
A real definition can solve part of the problem of the primitivist by defining our moral properties through the supervening relationship to mental/social properties. This solves the criticism from the primitive non-naturalists that moral properties are just too different from the paradigmatic natural properties. A metaphysical relation based on reduction of moral properties supervening on mental/social properties places these properties within the naturalistic realm, just occupying different phenomenal categories. For example, a quark is physical whereas goodness is supervening on the mental, but both are natural even though different.
The causal role of these properties comes into question with the primitivist non-naturalist by identifying that moral properties have no causal effect in the world. However, with the supervenience interpretation, rational agents make decisions based on these properties. These properties are what constitutes a good reason for an action and hence do have causal implications in the mind of the person. The restricted causal cosmological role comes from the supervenience of the mental/social properties limitation within the mind of people and not physical particles that interact with other particles to produce different effects in the universe. These properties are restricted to the mind that they are supervening upon.
Neurological Evidence
If we are to define moral properties as supervening on non-moral psychological properties, what would those psychological properties be? In 2002, Moll et. al. conducted an fMRI study to determine the neural correlates of one’s moral sensitivity. A variety of visual images were used to stimulate emotional responses and measure brain activity. The categories of images consisted of morally evocative, unpleasant nonmoral, pleasant nonmoral, interesting, neutral, and scrambled. It was found that certain areas of the brain are specifically related to moral evaluation in contrast to pleasant, neutral and random stimuli. Moll et. al. state, “The most striking findings were the increased activation of the right medial OFC and the medial frontal gyrus (MedFG) and the cortex surrounding the right posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS) elicited by the moral in comparison with the nonmoral unpleasant stimuli.” (2732) It seems that the activation of these areas of the brain can be utilized in a non-trivial real definition that connects the supervening moral property to the neural correlates of the right medial OFC, the MedFG, and the STS.
Experience and Moral Knowledge
Now that we have discussed the intermediary position between reductive naturalism, primitive non-naturalism and an example of empirical evidence for moral properties supervening on psychological properties, it is time to put the theory into practice. In McGrath’s essay, Moral Knowledge and Experience, she explains how the application of moral principles is dependent on experience even though the process of assessment may function in an a priori way. The a priori nature of morality is seen in our ability to determine a moral outcome of a situation by simply giving the details without actually experiencing anything. If someone gives you a case, you can determine what the ethical action is, as long as you have the relevant non-moral details. Our ability to apply our moral knowledge is increased from experience, even though the process in which we come to a moral conclusion may seem more like an a priori calculation, the quality of judgment is experientially improved.
McGrath explains how there are three primary ways that experience influences our ability to apply moral principles to situations. The first way that experience helps us apply moral reasoning is through an enabling role, where a specific morally evocative event will give the agent information necessary to comprehend the moral weight of the situation. The experience gives the agent the necessary evidence in being able to justify why a certain action or moral concept is appropriate. The second way that experience increases our ability to exercise our morality is through a triggering role by providing a variety of experiences that we can draw upon to come to a moral conclusion or understanding. The environment and our experiences provides us with unbiased feedback that we can accumulate and draw upon. The final way that experience supports moral knowledge is through a sensitizing role by providing evidence of non-moral information that we use in our moral deliberations. This sensitizing role can “refine one’s judgment to the point that subsequent exercises of that judgment are sufficiently reliable for its deliverances to count as knowledge.” (McGrath 12) In contrast to the moral opinions of others which only aligns us to conform to that group instead of illuminating moral truths, our experience provides non-misleading evidence to be used in moral judgments. According to McGrath, these three ways, enabling, triggering and sensitizing, are the avenues experience can increase one’s ability to apply moral reasoning to real cases in the world.
Moral Education Argument
Premise 1: Moral properties are natural properties that supervene on neural correlates.
Premise 2: Moral judgment increases with experience.
Conclusion: A certain form of training would prepare people with the necessary neural substrates to act morally.
Society would benefit from implementing a morality training component to the existing educational curriculum so that students are exposed to the necessary experiences for the neural wiring to occur in the respected areas of the brain that are needed for moral judgments. The training would include the elements of enabling, triggering and sensitizing in a way that would develop the neural substrates necessary for moral reasoning. As a society, we would also be better able to detect people who lack such areas in the brain at an early stage of development and provide countermeasures proactively to prevent antisocial or immoral mistakes in judgment. Certain kinds of moral understanding, like the concept of goodness or justice, may only be achieved in a comprehensive way if the person has the prerequisite experiences. There are certain forms of training that can create moral judgments, like empathy training, that give the person the opportunity to develop new skills.
A problem with this line of thinking is that morality may forever escape people with brain damage, psychopathology, developmental constraints and psychosis like schizophrenia. With this as an understanding, morality may only be achieved as a group as a whole. People that lack the necessary neural substrates for moral judgment, would require close social bonds with those who do have the necessary neurodevelopment. We cannot rely on individuals alone to be responsible for moral judgment if they do not have the cognitive capacity for that judgment. The best way forward would be to train those who have the necessary capacity for moral reasoning and develop alternative programs for those who lack the cognitive capacity for moral reasoning.
Society now begins to yield the power to teach people how to be good: by offering the experiences their brains require to understand and act good. Also, we can test and measure those who are incapable to these moral decisions and awareness such that we can foster relationships and provide support so they can transcend their cognitive limitations.
Even without a full comprehension of the necessary moral properties and nonmoral information, people will follow socially imposed routines if they develop a value for them. As a whole, humanity can utilize the strengths that evolution has given us and fill in the gaps where it hasn't with our culture. Instead of culture conflicting about relativistic matters, there seems to be a way that we can use culture to bridge the gap between those who really need help with their moral compass.
References
Dworkin, R. M. “Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 25, no. 2, 1996, pp. 87-139.
McGrath, Sarah. “Moral Knowledge and Experience.” PhilPapers.org, https://philpapers.org/rec/MCGMKA-2. 2011
Moll, Jorge et al. “The Neural Correlates of Moral Sensitivity: A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Investigation of Basic and Moral Emotions.” The Journal of neuroscience: The Official Journal of the Society for Neuroscience, vol. 22, no. 7, 2002, pp. 2730-6. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.22-07-02730.2002
Moore, G. E. Principia Ethica. Cambridge University Press, 1922.
Wedgwood, Ralph. “Ethical Naturalism, Non-naturalism, and In Between.” Academia.edu, https://www.academia.edu/47890818/Ethical_Naturalism_Non_naturalism_and_In_Between. 2021.
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