If someone mentions Wittgenstein, the concept of language games is quick to follow. In his Philosophical Investigations, he uses the concept of language games to further develop the notion of meaning. Language games is the way we determine the meaning of words by the context they are embedded within, how the word is used and the activities surrounding their use. Wittgenstein states,
“the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” (25e, R43)
This idea is in contrast to the associative understanding of meaning that a word has a direct relation to an object referred to. The purpose of Wittgenstein exploring the nature of meaning through the concept of language games is to break away from a word-object to an action-object approach.
Descriptive Explication: What is Wittgenstein Saying?
In his first remark, Wittgenstein quotes Augustine explaining how we develop an understanding of words and the meanings of them through an association to objects that people refer to. The words themselves are a signification of some object in the world. Augustine states,
“I grasped that the thing was signified by the sound they uttered, since they meant to point it out. … I learnt to understand what things the words, which I heard uttered in their respective places in various sentences, signified.” (Augustine, 5e, R1)
Wittgenstein views this description posited by Augustine as a word-object based picture that is the essence of meaning within human language.
The word-object based approach basically espouses that words name objects and a sentence is a combination of names. Wittgenstein summarizes the Augustinian position as such,
“Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.” (5e, R1)
He identifies a problem that Augustine does not differentiate between different kinds of words and is limited to basic nouns. He gives an example of a situation where the word-object association does not fit when a person takes a slip of paper to the shop stating ‘five red apples.’ Using the word-object associative method, one could connect a label to red and apple but the word five would not be displayed. The concept of counting is embedded within the term five and the slip assumes the shopper knows how to count. There is something missing from the word-object theory of meaning and Wittgenstein’s language games is meant to solve that problem. The meaning of some words cannot be derived from an object association but is determined by use.
Wittgenstein explains how the Augustinian word-object associative view of language in terms of ‘ostensive teaching of words,’ where
“children are brought up to perform these actions, to use these words as they do so, and to react in this way to the words of others.” (7e, R6)
He references his example of the builder and assistant. They have a primitive language where the builder calls out ‘Slab’ and the assistant brings the item needed. The ostensive teaching of words creates an association between the word and the object. The assistant can be said to understand the meaning of the word if they correctly fulfill the purpose of the call by the builder as in the ‘Slab!’ example.
In practicing the use of language, there is a person who calls out words and another will act on the call. While learning a language, the learner will name an object when the teacher points to it or the learner can simply repeat the word-object association the teacher vocalizes to commit the association to memory. Wittgenstein states,
“think of the process of using words in (2) as one of those games by means of which children learn their native language. I will call these games “language games” and will sometimes speak of a primitive language as a language-game…also call the whole, consisting of language and the activities into which it is woven, a ‘language-game’.” (8e, R7)
Language games are essentially meaning-relations using words, sentences and behaviours. Our expressions and actions involved in the use of words in meaning relations are also part of language games as seen in the act of pointing, asserting and the responses we give each other for correct use or incorrect misuse. There are a variety of different kinds of sentences and types of language games starting with the primitive associative, word-object, basic type.
Wittgenstein observed that the word-object account for meaning and language was incomplete for certain kinds of words and situations where the same word has different meanings. For example, words like ‘this,’ ‘that,’ and ‘the’ are not going to be relative to a consistent and specific object one can ostensibly point to and create an association. These words are like tools in the linguistic toolbox that we use to convey meaning within situations and contexts. (9e, R11; 22e, R38)
The types of language games one can engage in are vast as they are tools of communication. Wittgenstein states,
“The word ‘language-game’ is used here to emphasize the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life.” (15e, R23)
He lists many different kinds of language games with the use of different kinds of sentences like giving and acting on orders, descriptions of objects, reporting events, hypothesis formation and testing, questions, experimental results, acting in film, singing, riddles, jokes, mathematics, translating languages, etc. (15e, R23) All of these different uses of language are components of the utility it has for us in our communications.
Each function of a specific language game will have a different end in mind relative to the purpose of the participants involved. A statement that is intended as a joke requires a different response than a command. Laughing at one who utters a command will usually result in negative consequences including disbanding the social relationship the command is based on. Each language game will have its own rules that determine correct use responses from the people involved.
Rules are an important component of language games for they govern what is a legitimate use or misuse of a word within a context, appropriate responses to uses of words and ultimately influence meaning. Rules are not something that we automatically understand nor do they have their appropriate interpretation embedded within them in some a priori sense. Wittgenstein says rules are like a signpost [R85, 198, 199] for there exists some ambiguity in their application that can only be solved empirically like mastering a technique. He states,
“One learns the game by watching how others play it…we say that it is played according to such-and-such rules because an observer can read these rules off from the way the game is played.” (Wittgenstien 31e, R54)
We determine when someone is engaged in correct play or misuse of words relative to the responses of the other players in the game. We know someone is following the rules of a language game based on the
“characteristic signs of it in the players’ behaviour.” (ibid)
Propositions take a general form of stating how the world is but really is a description of the frame we impose on nature. [114] Propositions create a certain picture of the world for us that is dissociated metaphysically from the way the word is actually used in some situation or context. Wittgenstein states,
“When philosophers use a word …and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language ..it is at home?” (53e, R116)
He is trying to bring philosophy from a propositional, isolated analysis to an everyday usage observation. The ‘home’ of a word is how it is often used and the meaning associated with that use.
Propositions have such high esteem and value in philosophy because of their truth functionality. A proposition is a statement that can be either true or false and is part of the fundamental framework of knowledge: a true, justified belief. Wittgenstein states,
“we call something a proposition if in our language we apply the calculus of truth functions to it.” (58e, R136)
He quickly criticizes the truth functionality of propositions by identifying that the context that the proposition is situated in determines if it is true or false. He states,
“what a proposition is, is in one sense determined by the rules of sentence formation … and in another sense by the use of the sign in that language-game.” (ibid)
The grammar of English and the rules within the specific meaning-relation language game will determine how a proposition is to be interpreted and hence its truth value.
Philosophy deals with the challenges of attempting to determine the meaning of words like truth, justice, love and knowledge. Wittgenstein states,
“Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language.” (52e, R109)
He states that our language has grammatical illusions [R110] that give rise to problems. The project Wittgenstein has taken upon himself for philosophy is to set the boundaries or limits of philosophy in how we engage with language. He says,
“Philosophy must not interfere in any way with the actual use of language, so it can in the end only describe it.” (55e, R124)
He wants to resolve philosophical problems by avoiding misuses of language by actually looking at what we do when we use words.
Critical Evaluation: The Problem of Relativism?
Many philosophical discussions can deviate from how people generally use a word or the language games that are customarily played. This may be due to the fact that the popular contemporary usage of words is different from the longstanding history of philosophies’ ongoing discussion from the presocratics to today. People generally do not use words in the same way as philosophers because they are not engaged in the same kind of dialogue or search for meaning. Wittgenstein, however, does raise an important point to be aware of the usage of words and not separate them ‘metaphysically’ from their origin or home in our everyday communication.
Wittgenstein is not concerned about truth but is expanding on the theory of meaning in the philosophy of language. He moves away from the object-word, essence based approach seen in Augustine, towards an action-word approach. A problem arises where we can find ourselves in an ongoing spiral of relativism. If it is the case that meaning is derived from usage, then meaning is something that can always be changing and be different for different groups. We may never be able to standardize what a word means because as time goes on, society and cultures develop and grow. With this development and growth we observe that terms take on different meanings.
It may be important to note that this is actually a good thing: that an open ended analysis of meaning based on usage is more appropriate to how meaning of words actually exists. If it is the case that words change and take on new meaning, it is actually very useful for us to focus on the specific context they are used in so that we can have a better sense of what the people involved intended by their use. Imposing a standardized definition for a term may take away from how the term is being used and does not account for slang or humor. A standardized view of meaning may be very artificial and not get at what the users are trying to communicate.
At the end of the day, when one is in an unfamiliar social group, they will be pressured by empirical necessity to learn how that group uses their words. Imposing our own view of words may be incompatible with the custom of the people we are with and adopting a new meaning for a word and its usage is simply more adaptive and in one’s interest for functioning with that group.
The problem of relativism is avoided simply by stipulating what the words we use mean: not by an arbitrary standard but the specific context they are used in. Clarifying, “when you say X you mean this?” is the simple way to eliminate problems of ambiguity or equivocation in language games. One can win the language games by knowing what a person means and a relativistic approach is not necessarily a defeating obstruction. We can inquire and test our interpretation to the other person’s reactions and results socially. The builder’s example works well here. For the assistant to know their interpretation of the call “Slab!’ is correct may simply be the consequence of silence when the assistant places the slab in the space where a slab could fit. The builder yelling at the assistant would indicate a misinterpretation of the usage of slab in that context, motivating a further analysis of the other elements in the interwovenness of that language game to determine the correct response. The interwovenness of the word with ostensive actions and behavioural responses surrounding use, gives us plenty of indications of the meaning of words and the key to winning the language game.
References
Augustine of Hippo. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte. Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 5e)
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte. Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 5e - 199e)
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