In remarks 65-71 of his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein introduces his famous notion of family resemblances through questioning the essence of concepts. He begins this discussion with an objection to his concept of language games by identifying that he has not explained what their essence is,
“what is common to all these activities, and makes them into language or parts of language.” (Wittgenstein, R65, pp. 35e)
People are accustomed to identifying what is common among a set of things that classify them as similar. In the example of all the things that are common among languages, that they do not have a single common factor, however there is
“different kinds of affinity between them.” (Wittgenstein, R65, pp. 35e)
It is the affinity between the phenomena that we use to group them into concepts like language.
In remark #66, he introduces the concept of game and lists a variety of different games, asking what is common among them. There is an assumption that all phenomena we call games must have some commonality between them to be classified as games. However, Wittgenstien notices that, in actuality, if we actually look, there is no commonality between ‘games.’ Instead of some commonality that runs through all games, similarities and affinities exist between them. As you compare different kinds of games, they share some similarities/ affinities with each other and do not at the same time. Some games have the property of winning and losing, a ball, public entertainment, solo vs team play, and the differences and variations in skill for each type. Some that share an affinity do not have the affinities of others. Wittgenstein states,
“we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing: similarities in the large and the small.” (R66, pp. 36e)
Wittgenstein calls these similarities and affinities
“family resemblances; for the various resemblances between members of a family … overlap and criss-cross in the same way… ’games’ form a family.” (R67, pp.36e)
This is the answer to the great question of what is common to all language-games: he concludes that they are based on similarities of affinities of groupings called family resemblances. He supports this conclusion in his discussion of the concept of number by identifying when we call something a number it is because it has a direct and indirect affinity with other things called number(s). He expresses the notion of a concept and its use in a particular case in the metaphor of a thread twisted within a fiber. The thread is strong not because of one fiber but the overlapping of many fibers that compose the thread. (Wittgenstein, R67, pp. 36e) In some ways, we can say that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. The network of the similarities and affinities strengthens the notion of the concept in contrast to the specific examples in isolation.
From here, Wittgenstein addressed the point that the commonality within a set is the disjunction of their common properties. He quickly responds that there is a play on words and a category mistake thinking that the relationship between properties is the same as the properties themselves. Referring back to his previous metaphor,
“There is something that runs through the whole threat - namely, the continuous overlapping of these fibers.” (Wittgenstien, R67, pp. 37e)
The fibers being made of similar material is different from how the fibers overlap in the construction of the thread. Appealing that the disjunction of common properties is the essence of a concept does not account for any similarity between the properties, just that they are connected somehow.
Wittgenstein continues with the disjunction hypothesis in reference to the concept of number
“as the logical sum of those individual interrelated concepts…in the same way, the concept of game as the logical sum of corresponding sub-concepts.” (R68, pp. 37e)
He disagrees with this view and explains how concepts can have rigid boundaries or that the extension of a concept does not need closed boundaries. In his earlier example of a game, he demonstrated that it does not have a rigid boundary. (Wittgenstein, R68, pp. 37e)
The use of the word game is unregulated and not bound by rules. When we explain to someone what a game is, we refer to similarity in our description. We do not know the boundaries of what a game is not because we are ignorant of them, but because there are no boundaries. In special instances, we have the option of drawing boundaries for a particular purpose. (Wittgenstein, R69, pp. 37e)
The next objection that Wittgenstein addresses is: ‘If concepts do not have boundaries, how do we know what we mean when we use a word?’ He explicitly states that concepts have blurred edges in the sense that was discussed previously; that there is an overlapping of similarities where some cases have them and others do not. If it is the case that concepts have blurred edges, he then asks: ‘How is it a concept at all?’ He gives an example of a blurred photograph still being a picture of the person, even if it is not sharp. (Wittgenstein, R71, pp. 38e)
Wittgenstein predecessor, Gottlob Frege objects to this point, stating that if a region does not have boundaries it is not considered a region. Wittgenstein disagrees with Frege, stating that there is usefulness in giving rough directions or pointing that are not entirely clear. Ultimately, this is how we explain what a game is, beginning with a rough description or blurred boundary that
“One gives examples and intends them to be taken in a particular way - I do not mean by this expression…that he is supposed to see in those examples that common feature which I - for some reason - was unable to formulate, but that he is now to employ those examples in a particular way.” (Wittgenstein, R71, pp.38e)
We are not to assume commonality in the features of the examples but understand how the person is using or employing the concept/term. We can misunderstand each other when we speak directly and being indirect with an example is not a way of explaining. The to and fro of understanding the use of concepts, with the blurred boundaries they hold, is the nature of the language-game we play. Fundamentally, family resemblances are connected to the notion of blurred edges in a concept because of the overlapping nature of examples and cases within a concept that do not fit rigid definitions. It is our use of the blurred concepts of language and the iteration afterwards that refines the meaning of the concept based on its use.
Reference
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte. Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 35e - 38e)
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